Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Chapter 1: The Argument

• Study of murderous ethnic cleansing (MEC) and genocide: eight general theses, from micro to macro:

1. MC is modern: the dark side of democracy. It results from politicized nationalism: conflation of demos (citizens) and ethnos (ethnic group) that limit it and exclude ‘others’.
   1. MEC results from organic conceptions of nation and state than encourage it.
   2. Settler democracies have been truly murderous.
   3. Regimes newly embarked on democratization are more likely to commit MEC than stable authoritarian regimes.
   4. Stable institutionalised democracies are less likely to commit MEC than both above.
   5. Regimes perpetrating MEC are never democratic: “The dark side of democracy is the perversion through time of either liberal or socialist ideas of democracy” (4).
2. Ethnic hostility rises when ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channelling classlike sentiments towards ethnonationalism.
   1. Ethnic and class conflict infuse each other: one ethnic group must be seen as exploiting the other for ethnic conflict to develop.
3. Danger zone of MEC is reached when:
   1. Movements claiming to represent old ethnic groups claim their own state over all or part of same territory;
   2. This claim seems to have substantial legitimacy and chance of being implemented.
4. MEC is reached when:
   1. Less powerful side in encouraged to fight rather than submit by believing it has outside help;
   2. Stronger side believes it has the military power and ideological legitimacy to force through its cleansed state at little physical or moral risk to itself.
5. MEC occurs when state has been factionalised and radicalised amid an unstable geopolitical environment usually leading to war.
6. MEC is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators: eventually perpetrated deliberately, but the route to deliberation is usually circuitous.
7. Three main levels of perpetrator:
   1. Radical elites running party-states;
   2. Bands of militants forming violent paramilitaries;
   3. Core constituencies providing mass support.
8. Ordinary people are brought by normal social structures into committing MEC, and their motives are much more mundane.

• Defining terms: Ethnicity, nation, ethnic cleansing

1. Ethnicity is not objective: macro-ethnicities are socially constructed. It is a group that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture.
2. Ethnic cleansing is removal by members of one such group of members of another such group from a locality they consider their own.
3. Nation is such a group that has political consciousness and claims political rights in a given territory.
4. Nation-state results when such a group has its own sovereign state.
5. Multicultural states try to ignore ethnicity or to manage it through various constitutional methods (confederal, consociational). Toleration is a minimum standard.
6. Increasingly violent methods of coercion and production of a cleansed state:
   1. Voluntary assimilation;
   2. Discrimination;
   3. Segregation;
   4. Cultural suppression;
   5. Selective policed repression;
   6. General policed repression;
   7. Mistaken policies whose unintended consequences are mass deaths;
   8. Ethnocide: unintended wiping out of a group and its culture;
   9. Exemplary repression;
   10. Forced conversion;
   11. Politicide: target is entire actual / potential leadership of a victimized group;
   12. Classicide: intended mass killings of entire social classes;
   13. Genocide (R. Lemkin, 1944).

• Why does MEC occur? Why does it turn ‘really nasty’ in only a few cases?

• Rival Approaches to Ethnic Cleansing

1. Primitive throwback (primitivism);
2. old ethnic rivalries (perennialism);
3. Modern conflation of political ideals and ideologies (ethnosymbolism).

• Perpetrators: Nationalist Masses or Authoritarian Elites?

1. Two views dominate: perpetrators are either whole ethnic groups or state elites.
2. Whole ethnic groups never act collectively: individual members of core constituencies do – they also practice in-group policing.
3. “Once an ethnic identity is socially constructed, it may engender deep and long-lasting sentiments such that it becomes institutionalized, even structural” (21).
4. Radical elites, usually state elites are most usually blamed of MEC.
5. Authoritarian regimes are better than democratizing ones at damping down ethnic tensions unless these are securely institutionalized.
6. Party-states resting on mobilised mass movements are particularly prone to MEC through “unpredictable combinations of top-down bottom-up, and sideways-violent pressures that lead to the worst atrocities” (23).
7. Factionalized and radicalised states are most dangerous for MEC, which is almost always led by state elites.

• Rational, Emotional, or Normative Perpetrators?

1. Rational choice theory is pervasive, but cannot explain emotions.
2. Three ways in which war and violence seem rational (but are not):
   1. Security dilemma;
   2. Commitment problem;
   3. Information failure.
3. All three presuppose norms, values, identity formation; tend to assume that ethnic group identities and rivalries already exist.
4. Max Weber: four main types of human action:
   1. Instrumentally rational action;
   2. Habitual action;
   3. Affectual action;
   4. Value-rational action

• Perpetrators’ Motives: Ordinary People or Fanatics?

Nine common motives for MEC:

1. Ideological killers;
2. Bigoted killers;
3. Violent killers;
4. Fearful killers;
5. Careerist killers;
6. Materialist killers;
7. Disciplined killers;
8. Comradely killers;
9. Bureaucratic killers.

• Causal Model: The Sources of Social Power

Four sources of social power:

1. Ideological power: partially private and substantially voluntary.
2. Economic power: market choices.
3. Military power: institutionalised and kept away from every-day-life.
4. Political power: centralized, territorial regulation of social life. It is inherently territorial, authoritative, monopolistic. Political power relations are ultimately decisive in causing MEC.

Chapter 2: Ethnic Cleansing in Former Times

1. In premodern states class usually trumped ethnicity – therefore, there was little MEC.
2. People were killed for where, not who they were: murder to cleanse particular identities is modern.
3. This began to change with the rise of monotheistic salvation religions. Full macro-ethnicity emerged later – in modern times, and with it the potential for MEC.
4. Military power created most large states in history. Monarchies dominated political power, centered on regional courts, detracting from macro-ethnicity encompassing entire states.
5. Assyrians specialised in deportations, but not MEC. They eliminated troublesome states, not peoples.
6. “Macro-ethnicity and ethnic cleansing were rare in ancient times. Larger societies were ruled through class-bound lateral aristocratic assimilation. Conquered elites were assimilated into the cultural identity of the new rulers so that macro-ethnic identities were limited by class. There was massive violence, but it was almost never directed at cleaning whole peoples” (41).
7. With monotheism, states became ‘defenders of the faith’.
8. Christianity became the least tolerant of the world’s salvation religions: it practiced religious cleansing – targeting Christian heretics, Muslims, Jews, lepers.
9. By the 16^th century people, nation, sovereignty and state were becoming fused in Western Europe.
10.  Ethnic cleansing remained rare, unlike religious cleansing.
11. Post-reconquista Spain (1492) became laboratory of “total religious cleansing, becoming more ethnic as it proceeded” with expulsion of Jews and Moors: “a unique bridge to modernity” (48)
12.  1648 Treaty of Westphalia: Cuius regio, eius religio. No foreign aid to religious minorities any longer. “Cleansing was shifting from a religious to a national base, because the soul was becoming partly nationalized” (49): first Spain, then Western Europe, then Eastern Europe.
13. Cromwell in Ireland practiced forced expulsions and land expropriations in the mid-17^th century; Settlement Act of 1652 enshrined this into law. 15% of the Irish population died during two decades of warfare, primarily from malnutrition and disease.
14. Historically, cleansing was systematic, but not murderous cleansing; there was no relationship between religious cleansing and regime form. It ended when almost all states became about 80% mono-religious (53).
15. Summary: “[E]thnic cleansing was uncommon since macro-ethnicity was also uncommon. Ethnicity rarely conquered distance or class. But as salvation religions spread, religion began to cut across class and other boundaries, leading to protonational democratization and cleansing of the souls. Yet secular matters remained dominated by class and other axes of stratification. And with religious cleansing achieved, things seemed to be improving in Europe” (54).

Chapter 3: Two Versions of “We The People”

1. ‘People should rule’ rooted in US Declaration of Independence. Today, this legitimates most modern states and is considered to be “a good and moral collectivity” (55).
2. Two different kinds of people can be distinguished: stratified and organic.
3. Stratified:
   1. state as mediator;
   2. class-dominated,
   3. people as plural, shaped by contending interests institutionalised in political parties.
   4. voluntary assimilation into dominant linguistic group: no states were mono-ethnic.
   5. national identities only reached lowest classes in European states in mid- to late-19^th century: the nation was born very late! (60)
   6. each country blended class and ethnicity in different ways.
   7. Violent cleansing was confined to Europe’s peripheries (Scotland, Ireland).
4. Organic:
   1. Three differences led to organic rather than liberal conceptions of nation-state:
      1. Democracy appeared later – infused with idea that the whole people must rule; enhanced executive /statist powers and ideologies beyond liberal levels.
      2. State becomes “the bearer of a moral project” (62) and is more active for its citizens.
      3. Region was dominated by multiethnic dynastic empires, each dependent on elites of a single imperial ethnicity that divided, ruled and often discriminated against some minorities: imperial vs. proletarian ethnic conflicts.
   2. Organic conception of people and state: the people was one and indivisible, united, integral (63). “Class conflict and sectional interests were not to be compromised, but transcended, and displaced onto international conflict” (63). This generated ideal of transcendent nation and state, fueling “security dilemma” of dominant and subordinate ethnicities.
   3. Two potential vices:
      1. Can lead from democracy to authoritarian statism;
      2. Encourages notion that minority communities and political opponents can be excluded from full membership in the nation.
   4. Core beliefs:
      1. Enduring unique national character or soul;
      2. Right to a state that would express this;
      3. Right to exclude those with different characters who would weaken the nation.
5. WWI escalated organic nationalism (ON) in central and eastern Europe.
6. Rightist ideology embraced ON and idea of ‘cleansing’ the nation by resettlement (voluntary or coerced).
7. Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of national self-determination confused liberal and organic views of the nation and promised “democracy for each majority nationality”: he “believed that it was sufficient to create unitary nation-states with constitutionally-enshrined rights” (67).
8. For a minority, there were four possibilities in an ON:
   1. Revision of frontiers to minimize nationalities;
   2. Emigration and population exchange;
   3. Physical slaughter;
   4. Constitutional changes away from nation-state form.
9. Result was discrimination against minorities, coerced emigration, large refugee flows (10 million European refugees by 1926).
10.  Citizenship was now identified with ethnicity; minority members were second-class citizens.
11. Brubaker’s ‘Triadic Nexus’ of actors: national minorities, nationalizing state, kin-state.
12. Respectable conservatives were moving towards the ON model between the two WWs and mobilizing people behind nationalism, whilst denouncing leftists as enemies of the nation.
13.  Geopolitics played a moderating role because almost every national minority was a majority in another state; but if the balance were upset, all minorities could suffer.
14.  The combination of ON and the ideals of freedom, self-determination and representative democracy became ‘the dark side of democracy’, leading to vision of ethnically homogenous states grounded in ‘scientific racism’.
15.  Genocide emerges out of this tradition of modern science, modern politics, modern society.

Chapter 17: Combating Ethnic Cleansing in the World Today

• Eight Theses Reconsidered

1. Murderous cleansing has been modern – the perverted dark side of democracy, where demos and ethnos are merged.
2. Where successful, such movements trump class divisions.
3. Conflicts arise where two old ethnic groups make legitimate and credible political claims to the same territory.
4. Mass murder requires either a minority emboldened to fight by outside help, or a majority with the power to creates at present its own cleansed state without much physical moral or physical risk to itself.
5. Faction-ridden, radicalised states replace conciliation with repression and are assisted by external geopolitical pressures, usually war.
6. MEC is rarely the original intent of the perpetrators.
7. MEC perpetrators arise from complex interactions between leaders, militants, and masses, drawn predominantly from core constituencies favoring violent ethnonationalism. “Leaders are always the most important agents” (504).
8. Perpetrators are driven by motives found among ordinary people participating in mundane social movements, who believe in their cause and in the ends justifying the means. Three main ideological components can be detected: extreme nationalism, extreme statism, endorsement of violence.

• Ethnic Cleansing Declined in the North but Revived in the Global South

1. “The geopolitical environment of the northern peripheries is no longer supportive of murderous cleansing” (509).
2. Today, all MEC takes place in the global South, marked by the spread of the ideal of the nation-state that conjoins ethnos and demos into one ‘people’.
3. Elections become ethnic censuses, as ethnicity now trumps class.
4. The world is polarised between a Northern zone of peace and Southern zone of turmoil.
5. The rise of fundamentalism has weakened secularism, liberalism, and socialism.
6. These trends set the stage for rise of ethnic-religious conflict across the South.
7. Ethnocracy: a demos only for the ethnos. (519).
8. Struggles are not mainly between faiths, but within faiths, between secular and sacred conception of ‘democracy’ and ‘people’, often resulting in a politicization of religion into rival claims to sovereignty over the same territory.

• Policy Implications

1. Eight theses identify circumstances in which MEC occurs and processes whereby it unfolds. Liberal, tolerant democracies are not inevitable outcome of modernity. Democracy’s dark side is organic and exclusionary, dangerous for minorities.
2. We must engage with the world as it is and identify early warning signals of ethnic conflict – although exact prediction is not possible.
3. Rival plausible and achievable claims to political sovereignty spell difficulties, deriving from some past history of sovereignty and some recent continuity of claim (523).
4. Most minority movements could be satisfied with wider autonomy within existing boundaries, on confederal or consociational models.
5. Mere liberal guarantees of individual rights are inadequate: “Individual and group-based conceptions of rights are both necessary” (524).
6. These must be supplemented by collective guarantees of minority rights, policed by international agencies.
7. Neoliberal ideology enable inequalities to acquire ethnic overtones, thus encouraging “ethnic conflict between proletarian and imperial ethnic groups” (526).
8. Whilst ethnonationalism has grown ever stronger in the world and acquired global legitimacy, “[w]e are a long way from an international regime capable of enforcing global norms” against MEC (527). International courts or tribunals are ill equipped to deal with MEC claims involving thousands of offenders.
9. Ethnic cleansing is essentially modern, the dark side of democracy, but is NOT a necessary feature of the human condition; nor does ethnicity always trump other less violent bases of social organization.
10. Although we can now recognise circumstances in which ethnic cleansing threatens danger and then goes over the brink into mass murder and devise solutions to prevent this from actually occurring, “at present we lack the will to commit resources to those solutions in the South of the world.” (529).

Zolberg, A.R. (1983) ‘The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467, 24-38.

1. Refugees: “migratory segment of a larger group of victims, singled out for the wilful exercise of extraordinary malevolence on the part of their state of residence” (24).
2. Persecuted on grounds of political opinion / activity, or because of ascriptive characteristics.
3. Result of secular transformation of empires into. Nation-states.
4. Particularly acute in 3. World.
5. Migration is viewed as an economic phenomenon; refugee flows are primarily political – result of internal upheavals and changes.
6. Persecutor is the state – either directly or by indirection or both.
7. For political persecution – illiberal states are responsible.
8. Ascriptive persecutions result in massive refugee flows and account for current refugee crisis.
9. Question: “Under what conditions do states select certain categories of population as targets for persecution, expelling them outright or creating conditions that provoke them into risky flight?” (27)
10. Hannah Arendt: formation of nation-states leads to transformation of from human rights tradition to nationally guaranteed rights because “only nationals could be citizens” (28).
11. A “yawning gap between the formula and social realities” developed.
12. Two groups emerged who lost their human rights: the minorities and the stateless, resulting from “the inexorable conquest of the state by the nation” (29).
13. “During the interwar period, denationalization became a powerful weapon of totalitarian politics” (29). When undesirables could not be eliminated by expulsion, persecutor state devised “final solutions” for such groups seen as obstacles to successful formation of nation-state.
14. Not just ethnic groups but also religious ones and social strata could be seen as such obstacles.
15. Arendt: refugees result from transformation of empires and smaller communities into nation-states, taking place historically across wider regions and creating tensions within and between states.
16. This process of state-formation based on notions of ideological homogeneity started in Europe and eventually extended to the Third World as it underwent decolonization and resulted in countries with even higher ethnic and cultural hetereogenenity as Europe, heightened by social and political inequalities: “integrative revolution” (C. Geertz, 36).
17. Underdevelopment as key accelerator promoting deployment of increasingly authoritarian strategies to overcome both consolidation of nation-state and underdevelopment itself.
18. Execution of such strategies results in political persecution of certain categories of the population and causes massive refugee flows. Such tensions encompass entire groups of countries, resulting in interaction between domestic and international conflicts, compounded by intrusion of external powers with an interest in the region.
19. This is a protracted process that can degenerate into radicalization and even state terrorism, where changes of regime can result in drastic reversals of targets of persecution.

Kaufman, C.D. (1998) ‘When all else fails: ethnic population transfers and partitions in the twentieth century’, International Security 23 (2), 120-156.

Introduction

1. Separating warrying populations is best solution to many of the worst ethnic conflicts.
2. Key questions: do partitions and population transfers reduce or increase loss of life?
3. Move away from integrated multi-ethnic societies in post-conflict situations, as this may promote escalation of violence: separation of warrying groups may dampen conflict.
4. This remains controversial because of high human costs – only justified if it saves lives of people who would otherwise be killed in ethnic violence.
5. Key case-studies: Ireland, India, Palestine, Cyprus.
6. In all four cases, separation of warrying groups reduced subsequent violence, which resulted not from partition / separation but from incompleteness thereof.

State of Debate

1. Case for Separation:
   1. Security dilemma: no group can provide for own security without depressing security of others
   2. Power sharing techniques cannot work because they do not resolve such security dilemmas created by mixed demography.
   3. International community should endorse separation for some communal conflicts to avoid much higher human costs.
2. Case against Separation: Partitions and population transfers have 3 main flaws:
   1. They cause violence;
   2. They generate new conflicts;
   3. They create undemocratic rump states that perpetuate communal hatred.
   4. Therefore, reintegrating ethnic groups in conflict is both more moral and more practical than partition.
3. This conclusion is wrong because the security dilemma generated by intermixed populations “cannot be stopped except by permanent military occupation or genocide, or by not having the war in the first place” (10).

Solving the Debate

1. High-violence partition case studies are best to evaluate effects of international intervention
2. Four cases: Ireland, India, Palestine, Cyprus.
3. Ireland:
   1. Violence caused not by partition, but because partition did not fully separate antagonistic communities, especially in the North: fairly intense security dilemmas, in both North and South.
   2. Solution was a better partition line separating the two groups “as fully as possible”, resulting in “a smaller but safer Northern Ireland”.
4. India and Pakistan:
   1. Security dilemmas created by withdrawal of British imperial power: Muslim / Hindu SD nationally (incl. Kashmir), Muslim / Sikh in Punjab (more severe);
   2. Muslims remaining in India were two few and too dispersed to resist the Indian government (!);
   3. “The problem with Indian independence was not partition, but that partition did not go far enough” (76).
5. Palestine and Israel
   1. Security dilemmas generated by Israeli independence, not partition.
   2. In 1948 Israel, pattern of ethnic cleansing followed security dilemma logic and varied based on strategic needs of each place and time.
   3. Violence after 1949 was not caused by partition, but by existence of Jewish state.
   4. Settlements in West Bank generated new security dilemma; must be removed.
6. Cyprus
   1. Stable situation since 1974.
   2. Result of an intense security dilemma.
   3. Turkish invasion “did save thousands who would have been murdered” (97).
7. Politics of Successor States
   1. Critics of partitions and populations transfers overestimated the risks these “remedies” pose to political development
   2. Democratization
   3. Treatment of ethnic minorities
8. Challenges for Separation and Partition – Three lessons:
   1. Identify threshold of intergroup violence beyond which we must resort to separation and partition;
   2. Partition should only be undertaken if national communities are or will be separate at the same time: defensible borders are essential.
   3. Refugees from ethnic conflicts should be moved away from threats of massacres and resettled permanently – no return, because this would re-create the security dilemma that triggered the conflict in the first place.

McGarry, J. (1998) ‘‘Demographic engineering’: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21 (4), 613-38.

Introduction

1. Focus: state-directed movement of Ethnic groups as a technique to manage ethnic diversity: states move agents on behalf of the state and enemies perceived as threats to that state.
2. Shaped by nationalism – ‘ethnicized’ states and minority-based nationalist movements.
3. Securitization of minorities.

Why does the state move ethnic groups?

1. State agents moved in:
   1. To promote security.
   2. Consolidate state control over a territory
   3. Strategies:
      • Garrison-peoples;
      • Assimilationist strategies (ethnic intermixing);
2. States ‘enemies’ moved out:
   1. To consolidate control (reducing risk);
   2. To deter others from challenging the state;
   3. To assist in their assimilation;
   4. To break link between ‘enemy group’ and its ‘homeland’.

How are ethnic groups moved?

1. States ‘pull’ agents to desired locations
   1. Free or subsidized land, jobs, salaries
   2. New communications infrastructures;
   3. Favorable linguistic environment
   4. Military installations
2. States ‘push’ agents to move
   1. Soldiers who garrison outposts
   2. Compulsory jobs for graduating students
3. States often actively move enemy groups
   1. Exchange of minority populations;
   2. Initiating refugee flows;
   3. Direct force;
   4. Indirect coercion;
   5. Use of surrogates to inflict violence on minorities;
   6. Discriminatory measures;
   7. Stripping citizenship.

When do states move ethnic groups?

1. Imperial control strategies gave way to ethnically-based nationalisms: key role of nationalist ideologies in determining state agents and state ‘enemy’ groups.
2. Temporal factors:
   1. State captured by radical elites: importance of political leadership;
   2. State security perceived as threatened by minority groups:
      • Minority leaders reject state authority: The Rebel Threat;
      • Inter-state conflict when minority group is perceived as security risk: The Fifth Column. – movements are both punitive and preventive, based on revenge, radicalization, and instrumental reasons; facilitated and covered up by wars.
      • Neighbouring states dispute a region inhabited by minority group: The Irredentist Threat.
      • State acquires new territory inhabited by minority groups or Ethnonational group acquires statehood (with outside help) in a heterogenous territory: ‘Nationalizing state’: particularly when state is captured by radical nationalist elites who use conflict as opportunity to forcibly expel a minority and replace it with members of dominant group.

Conclusion

1. State-directed movement of ethnic groups is a technique of ethnic conflict management.
2. Main goal: consolidation of control over territory by facilitating control / assimilation of a minority group, or by its removal from a specific territory.
3. Continuum of tools deployed in particular when state captured by radical nationalist elites.

Jenne, E. (2016) ‘The Causes and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing’, in K. Cordell and S. Wolff, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, 2. ed, London, Routledge, 110-18.

1. Ethnic cleansing (‘EC’): “expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory”: “deliberate policy of homogenizing the ethnic make-up of a territory” both during war and peace; removal of targeted minorities from a territory and replacement with members of a dominant group: both ethnic expulsion and resettlement, violently or non-violently (110-111).
2.  EC accompanies almost every deadly conflict.
3. Some view genocide (extreme) and population transfers (moderate) as subsets of ethnic cleansing (111).
4. They differ in ethical and legal standing: Genocide is a crime under international law – implies responsibility by international community to halt violence; ethnic cleansing is a war crime / crime against humanity perpetrated by ‘our’ enemies; population transfers are neither – we undertake them to ‘save lives and rebuild peace’ (112).
5. Ethnic populations mix in Europe became a problem when national self-determination entitled territorialized national minorities to assert self-government rights.
6. Art 7, Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: population transfers are a crime against humanity. But realists still assert it is in some cases the least violent outcome (Mearsheimer, Kaufmann – 112).
7. EC use force to force / other intimidation methods to force targeted members of the group to flee; then they resettle abandoned homes with displaced members of dominant group (facts on the ground); then they destroy targeted group’s sites of national significance to “severe both the corporal and symbolic links between the targeted group and the desired territory”. Mass rape and impregnation are also methods of ethno-territorial conquest: “rape as genocide” (113).
8. Displaced minorities tend not to return, but to resettle where they are in a majority. Old territory becomes effectively ‘rebranded’ for the dominant group.
9. “As a general rule, ethnic war nearly always involves ethnic cleansing, but ethnic cleansing need not involve ethnic war” (114).
10. Argument that EC is product of ‘system-level variables’: modernity, state formation, national self-determination (114).
11. M. Mann: EC is outgrowth of democracy conflating ethnos and demos.
12. Others argue that nationalism and national self-determination are key drivers.
13. Essentialist perspective: EC results from past grievances and desires for revenge of ethnic communities.
14. Grass roots explanations focus on ecological drivers for conflict: deeply divided societies, redistribution of wealth, fear of losing status, mobilization of state institutions to mobilize people to engage in violence. Here, ethnicity is not original motivating force, but an ‘ordering device’ allowing politicians to organise their campaigns (115).
15. EC as Elite-driven project rooted in leaders’ special interests or ideologies – not product of inter-group dynamics, where monolithic collective actors inform elite preferences (both personal and geo-political): clear difference between responsibility of ‘ordinary people’ and of their ‘elites’ who are the architects of such EC campaigns.
16. ‘As a rule, programs of ethnic cleansing are designed and executed by aa handful of elites based on perceived strategic or economic imperatives, ideological convictions or personal self-interest” (116).
17. Negative popular support / compliance is more critical to success of EC campaigns than active support.
18. Elite and mass-level theories of EC are not incompatible.
19. EC should encompass both violent expulsions and quiet EC during peace time: implies need for interventions with broader mandate than just ending violence and keeping peace.
20. International community should “identify and target the architects of ethnic cleansing using a mix of legal and economic (and possibly even military) sanctions” (117).
21. Changing elite behavior can be more effective in preventing EC than large-scale social engineering: need for an effective early warning system monitoring elite behaviour.