Tullberg, J. and Tullberg, B.S. (1997) ‘Separation or Unity? A Model for Solving Ethnic Conflicts’, Politics and the Life Sciences, 16 (2), 237-48.

1. Ethnic separation should be regarded as an alternative to national unity, to be made democratically by the group proposing it. If approved, it should include population transfers. (237).
2. “A separate culture is the raison d’etre of a separate state” (237).
3. Involvement of outside powers is often decisive.
4. Separation tends to recreate old problems with reversed roles: members of old majority group become new minority in secessionist state.
5. New borders are required as part of a radical plan for change: aim – “to leave as few people as possible in the “wrong” state” (238): move towards homogeneity required.
   1. Equal number in each state;
   2. Natural border.
6. Both states may benefit by having a unified population (239). Three principles:
   1. Each state is responsible to accept people of its own nationality;
   2. Each state entitled to evict members of the other group;
   3. Each individual may emigrate to the ‘right’ state. (239)
7. “An examination of the alternatives reveals that nothing comes close to solving the problems in the long run.” (239).
8. Fundamental incompatibilities require a civilised divorce.
9. Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and incompatible with democratic principles and methods (239) based on the basic value of equal citizenship rights. Consociationalist solutions are temporary, not long-term. (240).
10. Group egoism and cohesiveness to gain strength in conflict with other human groups not necessarily based on kinship ties. (241). Four categories based on human’s ‘selfish genes’ (241) – drive for genetic self-interest:
    1. Egoism;
    2. Kin selection;
    3. Reciprocity;
    4. Group egoism: product of natural selection – rational because it increases individual survival and reproduction: “it is hard to see how humans could abandon this way of functioning”; futile to even try: ethnocentric rationality (241).
11. Altruism: results not from natural selection, but from cultural factors.
12. Manipulation: deception by promising advantages that are not delivered. People are smart enough to eventually detect this because they are zoon politikon (241).
13. How to distinguish between real group interests and deceitful claims? People’s democratically-expressed judgement should do so. (241).
14. “to promote interests through ethnic alliance has been a reality in history and will continue to be so. It seems futile to try to rid humankind of ethnocentrism by declarting it outmoded or calling it a mental malady, xenophobia” (241).
15. “A monolingual society has an obvious practical advantage over a multilingual society” (242).
16. Outside control of resources and job competition with immigrants can be harmful to the welfare of one’s own group (242).
17. “That irredentas are so seldom chosen is hard to explain for any reason other than that the leadership of the minority prefers being the ruling elite of a small entity to being integrated into a larger unity of the common creed, language, etc.” (242).
18. Origins of ethnic oppositions lie on long-standing conflicts: historic animosity between neighbours outweighs difference; ‘contact-hypothesis’ not enough to remedy this.
19. Nationalism is a modern variant of ethnocentrism. (243).
20. “One way to compensate for low rank is to emphasize superiority versus the out-group.” (243).
21. A group’s dissatisfaction capable of triggering separatism is rooted in exploitation by another group. Such inter-ethnic antagonism is composed both or real historical facts and constructed myths. (245). To avoid conflict, retaliation, violence, separation is a possible solution when there is no trust, belief and passion for a new start.
22. Four types of objections:
    1. Time: globalisation and emergence of a single international culture. This runs against realities of fragmentation, disintegration, nationalism, new states’ creation, supranational organizations providing for security and prosperity assuring viability of smaller states.
    2. Sympathy: ‘pity priority rule’: support weak against strong group. This is disastrous for peace. Also, roles can easily be reversed -today’s victims can become tomorrow’s villains, whilst certain groups can play both roles.
    3. Authority: the real problem is central governments’ (or the UN’s) lack of authority to impose peace. Authority is not enough; solutions must also be legitimate, and in accordance with recognised and certain rules and principles.
    4. Jurisdiction: limit ethnic demands past a certain level and in effect outlaw secessions. This does not really address the underlying problem and requires an alternate plan. “Separatism cannot be transformed from a political choice to a matter of policing” (246).
    5. Even democrats do not want to apply a democratic solution if they believe democracy will not only not solve the problem, but bring about more conflict, violence, and death. Such pessimism is not justified, and solutions such as the one proposed here of ‘civilised divorce’ can be found.